In this paper we analyze political parties' campaign communication during the 2009 European Parliament election in 11 countries (Aus, Bul, CZ, Ger, Hun, NL, Pol, Port, Sp, Sw, UK). We study which types of issues Euroskeptic fringe and Euroskeptic mainstream parties put on their campaign agendas and the kind and extent of EU opposition they voice. Further, we seek to understand whether Euroskeptic and non-Euroskeptic parties co-orient themselves towards each other within their national party systems with regard to their campaigns. To understand the role of Euroskeptic parties in the 2009 European Parliament elections, we draw on a systematic content analysis of parties' posters and televised campaign spots. Our results show that it is Euroskeptic parties at the edges of the political spectrum who discuss polity questions of EU integration and who most openly criticize the Union.
(1) Introduction
For a long time, EU integration has been regarded as a political process which is depoliticized and uncontested. This depoliticized form of integration has been characterized, on the one hand, by citizens' permissive consensus (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970) . On the other hand, it was national parties, social movements as well as the mass media -the intermediary organizations of our societies -that did not publicly communicate European matters and did not place them on the public agendas. However, more and more researchers challenge the idea of a depoliticized integration process in Europe.
On the side of citizens, support for EU integration has been declining since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007) . Eijk and Franklin (2004) were able to show that citizens' pro-and anti-EU orientations constitute relatively stable attitudes and that these attitudes do not only differ, but are more extreme than citizens' attitudes on the left-right dimension. Such attitudes, they claim, "constitute something of a 'sleeping giant' that has the potential, if awakened, to impel voters to political behavior that… undercuts the bases for contemporary party mobilization in many, if not most, European polities" (Eijk & Franklin, 2004, p. 32) .
Scientific dispute today refers to the degree of awakening of this sleeping giant. It is the intermediary organizations, specifically the parties, that foster or hinder such a process -others would call it the politicization of EU integration. Only if these organizations publicly advance EU matters and contest different positions will it be likely that voters will engage in political behavior (De Wilde, 2007) . Eijk and Franklin (2004) claim that parties still offer little choice with respect to EU integration but still follow a silent pro-EU consensus. But even these authors see it as only a matter of time "before policy entrepreneurs… seize the opportunity… to differentiate themselves from other parties in EU terms" (Eijk & Franklin, 2004, p. 47) . Other researchers observe that Euroskeptic parties have already started to break the silent pro-European consensus of the mainstream (e.g. Kriesi et al., 2006) as EU mobilization offers them the opportunity to differentiate themselves from others and thereby win votes.
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In our eyes, it is time to go beyond "lots of speculations" (Kriesi, 2008, p. 224) On the basis of this data, we study how Euroskeptic parties publicly articulate and contest EU integration in their EP campaigns. We are especially interested in finding out if there are systematic differences between different types of Euroskeptic parties, i.e., Euroskeptic fringe and Euroskeptic mainstream parties. More specifically, we address the research questions which type of EU-issues Euroskeptic fringe and mainstream parties address in their campaigns and whether these parties differ with regard to the degree and form of EU opposition. Second, we analyze whether there is a coorientation between Euroskeptic parties and pro-European parties with regard to the type of EU-issues addressed in the campaigns and the willingness to voice their position in reference to European integration.
To answer these questions, we proceed in five steps. (2) The identification of Euroskeptic parties and their location on the political spectrum
Euroskeptic parties between ideology and strategy
The conflict potential on the side of the citizens has triggered quite some research on parties' positions and their mobilization strategies towards Europe. Researchers have been especially interested in those challenging the pro-European mainstream, namely the Euroskeptic parties. Euroskepticism is a term widely used, but used with different connotations (Krouwel & Abts, 2007) . To clarify the term Euroskepticism, we follow the general distinction made by Szczerbiak and Taggard (Szczerbiak & Taggard, 2003) . On the one hand, Euroskepticism describes parties' general ideological position. On the other hand, it is also used to describe a concrete contestatory political discourse. These two concepts differ fundamentally as a party's broad underlying ideological position may be different from what this party chooses to publicly advance in a specific campaign. A party might be Euroskeptic in its fundamental position, but for strategic reasons might decide not to voice this skepticism in the context of an election campaign. In contrast, there may be mainstream parties with pro-EU positions that criticize EU integration for specific matters in the context of a specific campaign. Following this reasoning, we distinguish between a party's general ideological position and its strategic campaign communication. The question whether parties with an underlying Euroskeptic ideology also conduct a contestatory political discourse is one guiding research question of this paper. The other central question is whether in a specific political environment where Euroskeptic parties publicly voice their criticism, pro-European mainstream parties also put specific types of EU issues on the agenda and voice their positions on EU integration.
Euroskeptic parties and their location on the left-right spectrum
So far most research shows that Euroskeptic parties are primarily found at the fringes of the ideological left-right spectrum (De Vries & Edwards, 2009; Eijk & Franklin, 2004; Hix & Lord, 1997; Hooghe & Marks, 2002; Kriesi et al., 2006; Taggart, 1998) . The political spectrum can been described as an inverted u-curve. Traditional mainstream parties with ideologically non-extremist positions are located in the middle of this inverted u-curve. Most of them agree on a moderate pro-integration position. At the edges of this inverted u-curve, we find the more extreme parties which show a stronger tendency toward Euroskepticism. Those at the right end of the spectrum oppose EU integration primarily on cultural grounds, whereas they see less of a problem with the economic dimension of EU integration.
These parties perceive transnational integration as a threat to the sovereignty of the nation state, their culture, and traditions. Those at the left end of the spectrum oppose EU integration for economic reasons. It is the liberal free-market character of the EU that is perceived as a threat to social welfare achievements (Kriesi et al., 2006) . Euroskepticism in this perspective is treated as a fringe phenomenon in the party system. However, Ray (Ray, 2007) shows that there are some important exceptions where Euroskepticism has been taken up by mainstream parties, especially by the center-right parties.
Consequently, in the following we distinguish two groups of Euroskeptic parties: Euroskeptic parties that are located at the fringes of the party spectrum are separated from those Euroskeptic parties with mainstream ideology. In the following we will derive expectations about the roles that these two types of Euroskeptic parties play for the politicization of European integration.
(3) The role of Euroskeptic parties for EU politicization -hypotheses
Regarding the contestatory political discourse of parties, i.e., the question which type of EU-issues political parties raise in their campaigns, Mair (2007) identifies two mobilization dimensions: the functional and the Europeanization dimension. The functional dimension refers to policy areas where the EU already has competences. On this dimension the dispute concerns the approach and priorities.
The Europeanization dimension in contrast refers to the shape and reach of the EU, i.e., so-called poli-7 ty issues. The type of issues which should be discussed in EP elections are functional policy issues, as here the European Parliament is on equal footage with national parliaments at least in those areas where the co-decision procedure is applied (Jones, in press ). In contrast, the shape and reach of EU integration is still primarily decided by national politicians, and therefore these polity issues should rather be discussed in national elections. However, Mair (2007) Another concept closely related to the amount of criticism that Euroskeptic parties voice against the European Union is the form of opposition they choose. Here, researchers have worked on differentiating between soft / unprincipled opposition that refers to a number of policy areas and hard / principled opposition that involves the rejection of the whole integration project including demands to withdraw from the Union (Szczerbiak & Taggard, 2003; Taggard, 1998) . This soft-hard criterion allows us to understand whether Euroskeptics publicly fight the EU per se or whether they just advance different ideas about how EU integration should proceed. As we already argued above, we suppose that it is the parties at the fringes of the political spectrum which most likely will articulate principled opposition against the project of European integration. Hypothesis 2b referring to the form of EU opposition claims:
H2b: Euroskeptic fringe parties voice principled opposition against EU integration more often than Euroskeptic mainstream parties.
Our research hypotheses so far have dealt with differences between fringe and mainstream Euroskeptic parties. As we mentioned above, we will also seek to tackle the question whether there exists a coorientation between Euroskeptic and pro-European parties within each country. The rationale for this expansion of our research question is based on the understanding that parties strategically decide on their campaigns always with reference to the other competitors in their own system. No party has a monopoly on the overall campaign agenda. Steenbergen and Scott (Steenbergen & Scott, 2004) show empirically that EU mobilization of a party also affects the salience of EU-issues for other parties in the same country. This result is also supported for the campaign communication in six countries in the context of the 2009 EP elections (Adam & Maier, 2009b) . It is this idea of a co-orientation between pro-European and Euroskeptical parties within their respective national party system that we will implement in our study. First, we expect co-orientation regarding the type of EU-issues on the agenda. If Euroskeptic (fringe) parties campaign on the fundamental questions regarding the shape and reach of EU integration in a specific country, it is likely that these polity issues will also be prominently featured on the campaign agendas of pro-European parties. Hypothesis 3 referring to co-orientation regarding the type of EU-issues discussed claims:
H3: Pro-European parties will also put EU-polity issues on the agenda if Euroskeptic parties do so within a specific country.
In a final step we ask whether co-orientation between Euroskeptic and pro-European parties also exists regarding a clear position on EU integration. However, here we expect a reversed effect. Clear criticism from Euroskeptic parties forces the silent pro-European mainstream parties to also position themselves regarding EU integration and therefore to openly voice their pro-European standpoints. Hypothesis 4 therefore claims that Euroskeptic opposition is accompanied by articulated EU-support and therefore can be labeled as politicization hypothesis:
H4: If Euroskeptic (fringe) parties clearly voice their negative evaluation of the EU in the campaigns, pro-European parties will clearly state their positive views.
(4) Data, operationalizations, and methods
Before we test our hypotheses we need to describe how we identify and classify parties as Euroskeptic or not and as being fringe or mainstream and how we study their actual campaign communication.
Classification of parties
To classify parties in the eleven countries under study as Euroskeptic or non-Euroskeptic and as fringe or mainstream we rely on expert judgments (see the author list in this paper). Alternative sources of data, i.e., party manifesto data, are not available for all parties in our analysis and therefore cannot serve as the main basis for our classification. However, if manifesto data are available, we make use of them to validate our experts' judgments. In a first step, we need to distinguish Euroskeptic parties from non-Euroskeptic parties. For this purpose, we use a broad concept of Euroskepticism which includes soft and hard, principled and non-principled forms of opposition as well as opposition against integration per se or against the European Union as such ( for these concepts see Kopecký & Mudde, 2002; Szczerbiak & Taggard, 2003; Taggart, 1998) . On the basis of this broad definition, we asked the experts to identify those parties that have an underlying Euroskeptic position.
However, as Euroskepticism today is no longer just a fringe phenomenon (Ray, 2007) , in a second step we further divide the group of Euroskeptic parties into parties with an extreme ideology and parties that belong to the mainstream. Parties which our country experts classified as conservative / Christian democratic, liberal, social democratic, or green were rated as mainstream, whereas radical right and left parties classify as fringe parties. Poland. As there is no indication that the data from the party manifesto analysis is more accurate than our experts' judgements, 2 we rely on the data source that offers information for all parties in our study.
Yet we keep these five discrepant cases in mind when interpreting the results.
Content analysis of parties' campaign communication
To For each country we include all televised campaign spots and posters of those parties that won more than 3% of the votes in the 2009 EP election. Only for Austria, where televised spots are not common, we include newspaper ads as a functional equivalent. The cut-off criterion of 3% of the votes is necessary to limit the number of parties that are analyzed to a manageable size and to create a data base which allows for cross-national comparisons. However, we chose a low cut-off point so that fringe 12 parties without electoral success will also be included in the sample. All posters and spots were collected and content analyzed by our cooperation partners in the 11 countries. To ensure the quality of the content analysis, a common coder training took place in Berlin which was followed by coding exercises and a reliability test which produced satisfactory results (Holsti's reliability coefficient for spots: .73; for posters: .83). After the actual coding had been conducted by the native-speaking cooperation partners, the data was checked for internal consistency and -if necessary -re-coded in order to ensure the best possible quality of data. To study processes of co-orientation, we compare the campaigns of Euroskeptic parties to the campaigns of pro-European parties within each country. For an analysis of Hypothesis 3, we calculate the share of EU-polity issues of all EU-issues put on the campaign agenda. We expect that pro-European parties discuss the shape and reach of EU integration (EU-polity issues) within a specific country if Euroskeptic parties do so too (H3). Finally, for an analysis of Hypothesis 4, we compare the evaluation of the European Union / EU integration in its current form voiced by Euroskeptic parties to the evaluation by pro-European mainstream parties. We expect that a strong negative evaluation of the EU by Euroskeptic parties is accompanied by pro-European mainstream parties' clear, positive statements on EU integration (H4).
Before turning to the results, we need to add a final note on the logic of our data analysis. First, our unit of analysis is the party campaign, not the individual spot or poster. As a consequence, we calculated summary scores for each party to which each poster or televised spot contributes the same. These summary scores are based on 218 spots and posters of parties that were classified as Euroskeptic by our experts (N = 112 spots / including newspapers ads in the Austrian case; N = 106 posters). For nonEuroskeptic parties we coded N = 292 spots and posters (N = 112 spots / including newspapers ads in the Austrian case); N = 180 posters). Second, any analysis beyond the level of single parties is based on these summary scores per party. This means that each party contributes the same to these summary scores independent from the number of campaign materials it produced. Further, when calculating averages across countries, we additionally controlled for the number of parties within a country to make sure that countries with many parties do not distort the overall picture.
(5) Results

Campaign communication of Euroskeptic parties
On the basis of the party classification in Table 1 , we now select parties with a Euroskeptic position and study their campaign communication in the 2009 EP elections. Here, we are especially interested in finding out if there are systematic differences between fringe and mainstream Euroskeptic parties regarding the type of EU-issues they put on the agenda and the degree and form of EU opposition voiced in their campaigns.
Regarding the type of EU-issues on the agenda, we expect that Euroskeptic fringe parties feature EUpolity issues more prominently compared to Euroskeptic mainstream parties because a discussion of EU-polity issues allows them to put the fundamental questions of EU integration on the campaign agenda (H1). Figure 1 (Adam & Maier, 2009b; Kriesi et al., 2006) , but also stress the fundamental questions regarding the shape and reach of EU integration within their campaigns.
// Figure 1 Turning to the degree of opposition against the EU and European integration, respectively, we again expect that it is the Euroskeptic fringe parties that articulate their critique more strongly than Euroskeptic mainstream parties (H2a). Table 2 The analysis so far shows that criticizing the EU in public is still the field of the ideologically more extreme Euroskeptic parties with only small differences between right and left-wing extremists: Rightwing extremists have an average score of -.37, whereas left-wing extremists score at -.40.
Finally, we expect that Euroskeptic fringe parties voice principled opposition against EU integration more often than Euroskeptic mainstream parties (Hypothesis 2b). We study the form of EU opposition by analyzing the future visions for EU integration that parties publicly advance in their campaigns. In general, we can conclude from our data that Euroskeptic parties only seldom envision the future of EU 
Euroskeptic parties and the overall campaigns
In this final section we search for indicators of co-orientation between parties within the same national party system. We expect processes of co-orientation to occur as no party on its own has a monopolistic control over the campaign agenda. Instead, parties use other parties within the same country as reference points. Thus, we expect processes of co-orientation to also occur between Euroskeptic and nonEuroskeptic parties. By taking full advantage of the comparative research design, we study whether non-Euroskeptic parties put EU-polity issues on the campaign agenda and voice clear-cut positions regarding EU integration if this is what Euroskeptic parties do.
Hypothesis 3 expects that pro-European parties will discuss the shape and reach of EU integration (EU-polity issues) if Euroskeptic parties do so within a specific country. As in Figure 1 , we divide all issues discussed with an EU reference into policy, politics, or polity issues. For our analysis here, we focus on the share of polity discussions dealing with the shape and reach of the Union. We have chosen these discussions as they lie at the core of Mair's (2007) argument that EP campaigns -even if they are Europeanized -deal with those issues for which the European Parliament lacks decisionmaking power. Table 3 summarizes the results. It shows that in our 11 country sample -contrary to Mair's argument -only about 17% of all issues with an EU reference deal with polity questions.
Mair's general argument best describes the campaigning of Euroskeptic (right-wing) parties (26%), less so the campaigns of non-Euroskeptic parties (8%). Moreover, it is only in specific countries, namely Austria, Bulgaria, Portugal, the UK, and to a lesser degree also the Czech Republic and the Netherlands, where polity issues play a substantial role in the 2009 campaign agenda. Table 3 does not support the idea of co-orientation between Euroskeptic and non-Euroskeptic parties regarding the type of EU-issues discussed. With the exception of the UK and Bulgaria, where nonEuroskeptic parties also discuss EU-polity issues (however to a lesser extent), we do not find any sign for co-orientation. Strong polity mobilization from Euroskeptics in the Czech Republic and the Netherlands is not taken up at all by the non-Euroskeptics. The results in Austria and Portugal are similar.
This finding is supported by Pearson correlation: We do not find any significant correlation between the share of EU-polity issues put on the campaign agenda by Euroskeptic parties and the share articulated by non-Euroskeptic parties. In sum, our data do not support Hypothesis 3.
// Table 3 Finally we search for co-orientation regarding the articulation of clear-cut positions towards EU integration. For this research question, Hypothesis 4 expects a reversed effect. The stronger Euroskeptic parties voice their negative evaluation of the EU in their campaigns, the stronger pro-European parties respond with positive evaluations regarding EU integration (H4). If this hypothesis holds true, we would be able to observe a true politicization of European politics. Similar to the procedure followed in Table 2 , we calculate a score ranging from -1 to + 1, where -1 indicates that all campaign material of a party contains EU criticism, and a value of +1 shows full support, while 0 indicates a balanced or neutral campaign. Schuck & De Vreese, 2009 ) that leads to politicization. In this election we have observed such politicization in the Netherlands, in Sweden, and the UK. In these countries parties have taken the opportunity to differentiate themselves in EU terms (Eijk & Franklin, 2004) . As a result, we question whether the description of EP campaigns as uncontested and purely national is still valid. At least under specific conditions we find that contrary positions regarding EU integration are voiced.
Where should we head from here? Our analysis shows that the distinction between Euroskeptic positions and actual Euroskeptic mobilization is important. We agree with Szczerbiak and Taggard (Szczerbiak & Taggard, 2003) that this distinction can help eliminate much confusion in research about Euroskeptic parties. This goes along with the fact that one needs to measure and explain parties'
Euroskeptic positions and campaign mobilization with different factors. Regarding explanations, we need to rely on strategic considerations to explain mobilization, whereas ideological considerations are more important to understand positions (Szczerbiak & Taggard, 2003 counter-mobilization on the side of pro-European parties, then we would have uncovered an important mechanism fostering the polarization of opinions on -and thereby politicization of -EU integration. 
